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Silent Beneficiaries: Affirmative 
Action and Gender in Law School 
Academic Support Programs 
BY DARLENE C. GORING* 
INTRODUCTION 
T his Article was developed from a qualitative investigation' of racial and gender issues that arise in law school academic 
support programs. The qualitative investigation initially focused on the 
pervasiveness of racial and gender discrimination against students and 
faculty members involved with academic support programs.2 Sixteen 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1983, Howard 
University; J.D. 1986, LL.M. 1994, Northwestern University. I would like to 
thank Carolyn Bratt and Alvin Goldman for their valuable editorial suggestions, 
and Sadiqa Moore and Anitria Franklin for their research assistance and 
comments. 
1 The group interviews were jointly conducted by the author and Dr. Beth 
Goldstein, Professor of Educational Policy, Studies & Evaluation, University of 
Kentucky College of Education. Dr. Goldstein separately interviewed two 
students who did not participate in any academic support programs. 
2 See generally Judith G. Greenberg, Erasing Race from Legal Education, 
28 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 51, 51, 83 (Fall 1994) (discussing the presumption 
underlying academic support programs that assume that skills enhancement will 
put Black students on equal footing with their white counterparts, while denying 
the "fundamental differences between African American and white students' 
identities or to possible pro-white biases in legal education, the substance of 
those programs reasserts the superficiality of any differences. Because skills 
deficiencies can be remedied, such deficiencies do not challenge the perceived 
sameness of African-American and white law students." Id. at 83�84.}; Kristine 
S. Knaplun & Richard H. Sander, The Art and Science of Academic Support, 45 
1. LEGAL EDUC. 157 (1995) (discussing quantitative investigation and evaluation 
of performance of students in academic support programs at the University of 
California at Los Angeles); Paul T. Wangerin, Perspectives on Higher Education: 
Law School Academic Support Programs, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 711 (1989) 
(evaluating academic support programs in law school); AN INTRODUCTION TO 
ACADEMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION SERVICES (1992) 
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female law students3 participated in this investigation by agreeing to 
group and individual interviews concerning their overall law school 
experiences and their experience with academic support programs.4 
(describing components necessary to implement a fonnal academic support 
program in law school). 
For a comprehensive analysis of affirmative action in the law school 
admissions process and an evaluation of academic support programs, see Portia 
Y.T. Hamlar, Minority Tokenism in American Law Schools, 26 How. L.J. 443, 
450 (1983). 
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Fourteen participants are current or former members of law school 
academic support programs. Two participants were interviewed because 
they were invited, but chose to withdraw from the academic support 
program. 
All interviews5 were preserved on audiotape and transcribed. Because 
we agreed to maintain the anonymity of the participants, the students 
seemed eager to openly express their views. However, after conducting 
the first interview session, several subtle themes underlying the students' 
comments began to emerge which indicated limits to their eagerness. A 
number of the students were reluctant to acknowledge that they derived 
any benefits from affirmative action6 programs. Other students became 
The Program consists of several components. Most of the students 
interviewed in this study participated in a year long academic support program. 
This program provides academic and tutorial assistance to its participants on a 
weekly basis throughout the academic year. The participants are taught by 
students and faculty members, and are given the opportunity to experiment with 
a variety ofleaming techniques. The Program also includes a week-long summer 
program conducted prior to the beginning of the first year of law school. 
Participants in this program are exposed to traditional law school classes, legal 
skills training, and individual and group learning environments that are designed 
to introduce the participants to the academic rigors of law school. 
Two of the students interviewed for this study also participated in the six­
week summer institute operated by the Council on Legal Education Opportunity 
("CLEO"). CLEO is a national program that provides a "preview of the law 
school experience . .. [to] socially and economically disadvantaged college 
graduates" who are interested in attending law school. The CLEO program 
"includes courses derived from the first year law school curriculum, emphasizing 
legal methods and techniques while focusing extensively on abstract thinking, 
legal analysis and synthesis." COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUC. OPPORTUNITY, ALL 
ABOUT CLEO (1995). 
s Interviews with participants occurred on Sept. 6, Sept. 13, and Nov. 6, 
1995. 
6 In their dissenting opinion in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115. 
S. 
Ct. 2097 (1995), Justices Stevens and Ginsberg noted: "[T]he term 'affirmative 
action' is common and well understood. Its presence in everyday parlance shows 
that people understand the difference between good intentions and bad." Id. at 
2121. The author believes, however, that the more accurate meaning of the term 
"affirmative action" has been lost and replaced by individual impressions, not of 
what affinnative action is but of how affirmative action affects people's lives. 
As a result, for the purp�ses of this Article, the term affirmative action shall 
have the following definition: 
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uncomfortable when the subject of atlinnativc action was raised, and 
disassociated themselves when the topic was discussed. This subtle 
disassociation began to separate the group along racial boundaries. As a 
result, the focus of the qualitative investigation, and this Article, was 
modified to incorporate the students' views on the intersection of race, 
gender and affinnative action. 
I. FINDINGS 
A. Tokenism 
Many jurists and commentators question the viability of affinnative 
action programs7 because of the resulting perception that the participants 
are intellectually and academically inferior. Several of the students w_e 
interviewed were eager to challenge this perception and to discuss their 
own struggle to come to terms with the role affirmative action has played 
in their lives. At the subject law school, as with most American Bar 
Association accredited law schools white women and minorities account ' 
for a small percentage of the total student population. 8 The w omen 
The broader societal concept of affirmative action encompasses any positiv
e 
effort by business or educational institutions to advance the employment statu
s 
of target groups. In the words of one scholar: 
Affmnative action can be defined as attempts to make progress toward 
substantive, rather than merely formal, equality of opportunity for those 
groups, such as women or racial minorities, which are curre�tly 
underrepresented in significant positions in society, by explicitly taking 
into account the defining characteristic- sex or race- which has been 
the basis for discrimination. 
SUSAN D. CLAYTON & FAYE J. CROSBY, JUSTICE, GENDER AND AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION 3 (1992). / 7 See generally Ken Feagins, Wanted - Diversity: White Heterosexua 
Males Need Not Apply, 4 WIDENER J. Pus. L. 1 (1994). Feagins argues 
for 
elimination of race-based group affirmative action preferenr,es in favor of an 
individualized application of preferences to "minorities who have been bann
ed 
by the perpetuation of purposeful discrimination " and "reasonable accotllIIloda­
tion for qualified white males who are harmed as a result of minority-based 
classifications." Id. at 46. He asserts that modifications to existing affirmative 
action programs will eliminate the resentment that white males experience as 
a 
result of race-based preferences. See also Paul D. Carrington, Diversity!, I99Z 
UTAH L. REv. 1105 (discussing negative implications of race and gender based 
affirmative action quotas in higher education) .. 
8 Fall 1994 Law School attendance figures for ABA-Approved LaW 
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interviewed in this study all agreed that their limited numbers raise 
presumptions about their intellectual abilities among their male counter­
parts. Commentators have observed that male students require some 
tangible evidence of intellectual competence in order to justify the 
presence of the white women and minorities in law school. In the absence 
of such justification, the men simply dismiss them as "tokens"9 o r  
"affirmative action babies." Several students spoke with an underlying 
degree of anger about the necessity to overcome this presumption: 
I would rather them group me ... and get the extra help and then g o  
ahead and get my grades. Okay, if you are going to label me as a token, 
I might as well be a good one as far as that. Of course everybody has 
different views, like oh, gosh, I wish I didn't have to come in this 
program, but you might as well take the help, that's the way I figure 
and do what you have to do. 
Schools indicates that 128,989 students were enrolled in juris doctor programs, 
including 55,808 women, and 24,611 minorities. The minority group classifica­
tion includes students who identify themselves as Black, not of Hispanic Origin; 
American Indian or Alaskan Native; Asian Pacific Islander; Mexican-American; 
Puerto Rican; and Other Hispanic American. A REVIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION 
IN THE UNITED STATES FALL 1994 (Rich L. Morgan, American Bar Association 
Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar ed., 1994). It is important 
to note that minority women are counted in enrollment figures for both minority 
students and for women. Telephone Interview with Rick Morgan, Data Specialist, 
American Bar Association (Apr. 23, 1996). 
9 See Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at 
One Ivy League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1994). Professor Guinier 
notes that the perception of women as tokens has a detrimental impact on their 
performance: 
Our claim is that the proportional scarcity of "elite women" sets u p  a 
dynamic of virtual tokenism, in which the more numerically significant 
women students are nevertheless treated as, or self-identify as, "tokens." 
This dynamic exists in both the manifest and latent structure of the Law 
School, as well as in both the actual treatment of female students and 
their perception of their treatment by male students and faculty. As with 
true tokens, the dynamic of virtual tokenism reinforces limitations on 
the opportunity for success of women law students. Also similar to true 
tokens, many female students at the Law School enter the institution 
with identical credentials and then differentiate significantly from their 
�ale peers in terms of academic achievement, voluntary class participa­
tion, and interaction with faculty. 
Id. at 78 (citations omitted). 
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I don't want people to think I'm just here because I'm a woman. 
I ignore it, even I thought it. If somebody is going to pull that crap, I 
wouldn't think about, I wouldn't allow it to keep popping in my head 
even if I really kind of deep down thought it, that's irrelevant, we 're all 
here now. It's kind of like you walk in after you get in and the slate's 
clean. Your scores mean nothing, your GPA [Grade Point Average] 
means nothing. You just walk in here and it's like you' re the same until 
the first semester grades come out and you get ranked all over again. So 
it's kind of like, well who cares how I got in, I got in, I'm just as good 
as you now . . . 
One of the white female students interviewed in this study discussed 
"tokenism" as a function of age, not gender. When asked whether she 
perceived herself as a token, she replied: 
No, no. There are lots of females. I'm obviously the oldest. I hope I'm 
not here for that reason. I hope that's not it. It does kind of make, not 
make me feel bad but make me . . . it has a negative effect. If someone 
would tell me that I was here for that reason it would kill me. For 
someone to think that I didn't have the academic ability and they just 
let me in because they needed an older woman, it would just kill me. 
B. Stigma 
When the fonnal academic support program at the subject law school 
was implemented in 1994, the faculty members administering the 
program assumed that participation in the program would impose a 
double stigma10 on the students, based in part on their existing status as 
10 See generally City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 
( 1978) (plurality opinion) ("Classifications based on race carry a danger 
of 
stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they m�Y 
in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to politics of racia
l 
hostility."); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (19
78) 
(plurality opinion) ("Preferential programs may only reinforce conunon 
stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success withou
t 
special protection based on a factor having no relation to i ndividual worth."); 
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 343 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("A 
segregated admissions process creates suggestions of stigma and caste no l�ss 
than a segregated classroom, and in the end it may produce that result despite its 
contrary intentions."). 
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members of racial 11 or gender-based minority groups, and in part 
because of their participation in the program. After numerous discussions 
about the issue of stigma, the law school faculty administering the 
program concluded that their ability to address the imposition of stigma 
was at best limited, and more realistically, nonexistent.12 As a result, the 
faculty decided to address any problems on a case-by-case basis, and 
hope that the students were mature enough to respond appropriately to 
any problems. Although this laissez-faire approach was most expedient 
for the faculty members, the students were left to make their own 
decisions about their response to the stigma associated with their 
participation in the program: 
11 See generally John K. Wilson, The Myth of Reverse Discrimination in 
ffigher Education, l 0 J. OF BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC. 90 (Winter 1995-1996) 
(attributing the stigma associated with affirmative action programs to an ongoing 
perception that unqualified Blacks have been the recipients of educational 
benefits at the expense of white males). Wilson states that: 
There is no doubt that affirmative action often stigmatizes those who 
benefit from it, but mainly this is because the myth of reverse discrimi­
nation denigrates the abilities of minorities. Minorities admitted to elite 
colleges or hired for top faculty positions are widely presumed to be 
unqualified beneficiaries of an undeserved preference. The fact that the 
charge is untrue does not always mitigate the harmful effects it 
produces, from minorities doubting their own abilities to racist 
assumptions about them by others. But it is racism, not affirmative 
action, that stigmatizes minorities. 
ld. at 90. 
12 See AN INTRODUCTION TO ACADEMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, LAW 
SCHOOL ADMISSION SERVICES ( 1992) (concluding that the stigma associated with 
the selected for participation in a cademic support programs can not be eliminat­
ed, but can be addressed by law schools that acknowledge that value of 
affirmative action, 
[w]here academic institutions demonstrate a clear commitment to 
provide the highest quality education experience to students with special 
needs, and place a high value on the type of education provided in a 
sound academic assistance program - that is, a carefully constructed, 
logically developed curriculum tailored to enhance individual student 
strengths and remedy individual student deficiencies - the stigma that 
may attach to the experience will be diminished. On the other hand, 
support program students who receive more individualized education 
services than the mainstream will more likely consider themselves 
stigmatized when faced with institutional ambivalence toward the 
academic assistance that they receive. 
Id. at 5). 
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I felt like I let myself down. Like I was so concerned about, like 
embarrassing myself. Now I don't know why, it seemed silly, but I was 
traumatized by the whole thing and I felt like I kind've sneaked into the 
room one afternoon a week. No one in the group really talked about 
anything outside of the group. I never told any of my friends that I was 
doing it and they all talked about it but I just felt really strange about 
the whole thing, but now I realize that was kind've silly and I would 
encourage everyone not to feel that way. 
I guess what was running across my mind is that when other people see 
us coming to these academic . . . programs, what are they going to 
think? Do they automatically put group names on people who are 
attending these classes, oh, she's here because she is this, or she's here 
because she's female, or she is here because she is Black and she needs 
us to help her out? So I just wonder how other people perceive the 
group that goes, and I mean, personally I don't care .... 
I still think about it sometimes. I still feel like since I was participating 
in the [summer academic support program], I think about it, I mean. I 
kind of try to compare like what people who weren't in the program, 
how they are doing and how they are understanding with what I'm 
doing now and I just wonder if I'm up to par a lot of time. But I still 
think about that sometimes, that I'm not as quite as smart as I thought 
I was when I first came in. I wasn't full of myself but I'd worked really 
hard in undergrad and I sacrificed a lot of fun times for studying and 
I felt like that I had a 4.0 every single semester of my college career 
except for one and I just felt like I was the smartest person or next to 
the smartest person in the class. I guess when I was put in the, invited 
to the program that it kind of, it made me feel a little funny and it made 
me think well maybe I'm not as smart as I always thought I was or 
maybe I was fooling myself and I was only memorizing and not really 
actually gaining knowledge. 
I don't have a problem with it. I don't care who knows ... if this 
program actually ends up being a help to all of us, they're going to 
wish they had been in there and they're going to be like, "that's not fair 
because you had this and I didn't and that's the reason you did better 
than me on this." I don't care. I'll tell them if they ask me, I don't care. 
And I don't think we're stigmatized as far as the fact that we're in this 
program because I think if the admissions committee didn't think we 
were qualified or dido 't think we could make it, why would they accept 
us into the university in the first place. So, that's pretty much my stand. 
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I just look at it as an added advantage kind of like [another student). 
It's kind of like sacred but I don't mind telling anybody. 
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One student spoke very candidly about the stigma she felt because of 
the racial composition of the academic support program. The stigma this 
student associated with the program was so significant that after attending 
the first meeting, she refused to participate in the program: 
When l walked in that classroom and saw who was in there, I felt a 
stigma ... Well, it just made me feel like, why was I picked, just 
because of the assortment of people who were there . . . I was 
wondering why all of us were picked. What, like, did we, was our GPA 
something different or were we all stupid, you know. I don't know, but 
that's the way l felt. I don't know. Prejudice on my part ... walking 
into that room didn't strike me as being the best and the brightest, 
looking at the people who were there. Just a general impression, not a 
fact. 
She recalled that there were about fifteen students in attendance at the 
first meeting. This student described the group as "[m]inorities, either 
age-wise or color or someone who had been out of school for a long time 
or a while." Because of the group's composition, she recalled feeling 
"like I had been picked out as one of the dumb ones and it did make me 
wonder what the criteria was." During the interview of this student, it 
was clear that the stigma she experienced has negatively influenced her 
law school experience. 
Another student noted that the stigma associated with the program 
was the result of the identification of some students by the faculty as 
specifically in need of academic support. Instead, the student advocated 
a program that would be open to all students on a voluntary basis: 
If it's across the board well then they would think that there is a study 
group for people and I'll stay in ifl need it. If it's a voluntary study 
group. If you feel like you need extra help come. Because if they say 
it's because I identified myself in my personal statement wouldn't that 
be what I was doing anyway, I would be saying that I need extra help. 
So offer it to everyone and if I was a person who would have identified 
myself on a personal statement well then I'm just identifying myself a 
step later. Isn't that really, I mean how can they say that you have 
identified myself when I thought I was getting a scholarship. And so, 
if it is supposed to be because I identified myself well then, let 
everyone have the opportunity to identify themselves knowingly. Not 
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because something was said identifying yourself as wanting to be in a 
study group. There may have been something about would you be 
willing to be in a study group. Well, sure, I'll check that, yeah. But I 
don't want to be in a study group at school because I won't do well. 
You know, who needs that pressure. 
Vocal opposition to affirmative action came from one biracial student 
who views affinnative action as too stigmatizing. The biracial student 
noted that: 
I guess I don't hold the popular view, I think minorities and women 
will always be in law school regardless of affirmative action, there are 
a lot of bright, articulate women out there, minorities and I think we 
can still do it, you know without the affirmative action. Personally, I 
know this is going to sound awful, I don't like affirmative action to a 
certain extent because every time people blame it, it's like a crutch for 
them, to say you're here because of affirmative action and I always had 
the feeling if it's not there they can't blame it on anything, I'm here 
because I'm qualified. Maybe I have my head in the sand, I don't know. 
I don't see how men and women are unequal, I don't see it, we are all 
here for the same goals and I think we are all part of a equal field. 
Maybe I'm wrong, maybe I'm totally blind. 
C. Concerns Regarding Legal Challenges to Affirmative Action 
Programs 
1. Race-based Affirmative Action Programs 
The question that provoked the most open and frank discuss�on 
addressed the students' views on the decline of affirmative action 
initiatives in law school admissions and retention programs. It was �ot 
�ex�ected th�t the students divided along racial lines when discussin
g 
�is issue. Without exception, the Black students acknowledged the 
importance of affirmative action programs in law schools13 and ex-
13 See generally Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action f0' Whom?, 4? STAN. L. REv. 855 (1995) (examining the role that affirmative action pro�s can play to ameliorate the circumstances of a number of disadvantaged racial an� ethnic groups, including African Americans, Latinos, Asian AI11eric�, and Nati:e Am�ricans); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas in AJ]irmative Action: Attacking Racism in the Nineties, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043 
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pressed concerns over recent court decisions that seem to predict the 
elimination of affirmative action programs: 
Definitely, yes. I really do believe it. That's one of the reasons that I'm 
here. Well I think that when I first looked into going to law school I 
said this is one of the issues that I wanted to fight for but it looks that 
as though by the time I get out of law school I'll be fighting to get it 
back. I mean, you know, it's just it would definitely have a profound 
effect, I believe. and it worries me because I just don't think that we'll 
get that chance to prove ourselves if affirmative action is eliminated that 
we have now. And I just worry about future generations. I worry about 
my sister coming after me. How is 1t going to be for her. It's something 
I think about pretty much daily actually. 
It kind of angers me and it's a little frightening because it's like okay, 
affinnative action this year. what's next. It's like these white males are 
in power and it's like a disease, like what is going to stop them, you 
know. There is no vaccine or something. It's like, they were getting 
more and more power taken away, something that was meant to bring 
about a bit more evenness to give some people a chance that they won't 
have otherwise. Yeah, it bothers me. I kind of feel helpless about it. 
One theme underlying the comments expressed by all of the students 
interviewed for this study was the impres sion that affirmative action 
programs are primarily race-based, not gender-based, initiatives. Since 
this perception was so pervasive among the study participants, this Article 
will explore the constitutional treatment and protection afforded to race 
and gender-based classifications that serve as the framework upon which 
the views of the students participating in this study were formed. Since 
its decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 14 the 
(advocating the implementation of mandatory quotas or nwnerical goals in the 
admission of minorities to institutions of higher education because notwithstand­
ing the visibility of successful Black lawyers, and myths about the success of 
affirmative action, Blacks are still underrepresented in the legal profession). 
14 438 U.S. 265 ( 1978) (plurality opinion) (holding that race-based medical 
school admissions program violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). The inability of the Supreme Court to reach a 
consensus opinion in this case leaves open the question of whether institutions 
of higher education may consider race as a constitutionally pennissib�e factor f�r 
the purpose of recruiting and retaining a diverse student body. This author ts 
currently developing an article that will thoroughly examine this issue, and the 
952 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 84 
United States Supreme Court has applied an increasingly exacting 
standard of constitutional review to race-based affirmative action 
programs, but has remained inexplicably silent regarding the constitution­
ality of gender-based affirmative action programs. This is a difficult 
concept to accept, especially when white women, who may not be 
detrimentally affected by the elimination of certain affirmative action 
programs, challenge the importance or fairness of race-based programs. 
The uncertainty surrounding the continuation of affirmative action 
programs for women and minorities in higher education fosters the 
students' perception that the composition of law school classes in the 
future will not resemble the diversity that is characteristic of our 
society.15 
As one student noted: 
Well, basically it makes me angry that they're going to take up or are 
trying to take away affirmative action because you can look at the 
number of women and minorities that are here in the law school and 
you can tell that as far as Black people this was the biggest class we've 
had and as far as women there are less women here. And if, you know, 
if they take that away I just have the feeling that i t  is going to be all 
white men . . . becau�e you have people who are racist who are in 
power as well and they will use their power to keep people out. And I 
think this is one of those things that gives those underprivileged people 
who didn't have an opportunity to actually get an opportunity to get the 
chance. I think the number is going to decrease rapidly. It's not just the 
law school, it's everywhere. 
The Black law students in this study expressed legitimate concerns 
that l�w .schools will revert to havens for privileged white males 
as. th
e 
constitutional review of race-based preferences becomes more exactmg. 
As recently as 1995, the United States Supreme Court, in Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, held that the United States Constitution's 
si�ficance of the decision in Hopwood v. Texas 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. ), cert. 
deme
�, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996) and its impact �n race-based admission a
nd 
reten�!on criteria in legal education . 
. The levels of racial, ethnic, and gender diversity in law schools todaY are a relatively recent phenomenon. For a history of the gradual integration 
of 
�o;en and minorities in legal education, see generally CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, 
MA:: IN LAW 49-59 (2d ed. 1993); J. CLAY SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION: THE 
SCHOOL· r TH
E BLACK LAWYER 1844-1944 ( 1 993); ROBERT STEVENS, LAW . EGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM 1850s TO THE 1980S (l9S3)· 
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guarantee of equal protection1r. requires the court to apply the "strictest 
judicial scrutiny" to any race-based classifications imposed by federal, 
state or local governments. 1 - The strict scrutiny analysis requires a 
proponent of race-based a flirmative action programs to "show that its 
purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, 
and that use of the classification is ·necessary ... to the accomplishment' 
of [the proponent's] purpose or the safeguarding of its interests."18 
Application of the strict scrutiny analysis to these programs is an almost 
insurmountable hurdle to overcome. 
In Adarand, the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality19 of the 
Department of Tra nsportation 's ("DOT') practice of awarding additional 
compensation to general contractors if the contractors "hired subcontrac­
tors certified as small businesses controlled by 'socially and economically 
disadvantaged individuals.' "20 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of DOT 's motion for summary 
16 The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, 
in pertinent part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; ... nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 1. 
17 Adarand, 115 S .  Ct. at 2113. 
18 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305 (plurality opinion) (citing In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 
717, 721-22 (1973)). 
19 The plaintiff, Adarand Constructors, alleged violations of the equal 
protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, which 
provides, in pertinent part: "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Adarand, 115 
S. Ct. at 2105-06. 
Act 
20 Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2102. The Court stated that the Small Business 
defines "socially disadvantaged individuals" as "those who have been 
subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because of their 
identity as a member of a group without regard to their individual 
qualities," ... and it defines "economically disadvantaged individuals" 
as "those socially disadvantaged individuals whose ability to compete 
in the free enterprise system has been impaired due to diminished 
capital and credit opportunities as compared to others in the same 
business area who are not socially disadvantaged." 
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(6)(A)). DOT extended the definition of "socially 
and economically disadvantaged individuals" to include women, pursuant to the 
Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987, 23 
U.S.C. § 101 (1987). Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2103. 
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judgment.21 The Supreme Court, however, vacated this decision, noting 
that the Court of Appeals, as a result of its reliance on Fullilove v. 
Klutznick22 and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,23 erroneously applied 
a lenient standard of review to determine the constitutionality of DOT's 
program. 24 The Supreme Court held that .. all racial classifications, 
imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be 
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny."25 As a result, the 
Court remanded the case for evaluation under the appropriate standard of 
review.26 
Underlying the Court's application of the strict scrutiny analysis to 
race-based affirmative action programs is the long held treatment of race 
as a constitutionally suspect classification. 27 Unlike racial classifications, 
gender-based classifications are not constitutionally suspect,28 and 
therefore are not subject to the strict scrutiny analysis that is imposed on 
racial classifications. 
The Supreme Court justifies its heightened review of race-based 
programs by relying on three propositions - skepticism, 29 consisten­
cy, 30 and congruence.31 These three propositions justify the court's 
21 Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2101. 
22 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (holding that the Public Works Employment Act of 
1977, 42 U.S.C. § 6701, which required 10% of federal funds for public works 
projects go to minority contractors, is constitutional). 
23 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (holding that Federal Communication Commission 
minority preference policies do not violate the Equal Protection Clause). 
24 Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112. 
25 Id. at 2113. 
26 Id. at 2118. 
27 In Bakke, Justice Powell concluded that "[r]acial and ethnic distinctions 
of any sort are inherently suspect and thus c all for the most exacting judicial 
examination." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291 (plurality opinion). 
28 Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 (1982) 
(holding that the denial of a male applicant for admission violated equal 
protection). 
29 Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 
U.S. 267, 273 (1986) (opinion of Powell, J.) ). Justice O'Connor's opinion for the 
majority inAdarand notes that skepticism is inherent in" '[a]ny preference based 
on racial or ethnic criteria,' and as such 'must necessarily receive a most 
searching examination.'" Id. 
30 The concept of consistency requires courts to apply the "strict scrutiny" 
test to all race-based classifications. Id. 
31 Congruence demands that courts apply the same equal protection analysis 
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application of the strict scrutiny test to any equal protection challenge of 
race-based classifications. The Supreme Court in Adarand defines the 
principle of consistency as "whenever the government treats any person 
unequally because of his or her race, that person has suffered an injury 
that falls squarely within the language and spirit of the Constitution's 
guarantee of equal protection. "32 The use of this principle allows the 
Court to ignore history and the continued existence of racism in our 
society by treating remedial and invidious racial classifications in the 
same manner. Although Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion in 
Adarand notes that "[i]ndividuals who have been wronged by unlawful 
racial discrimination should be made whole; but under our Constitution 
there can be no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor race,"33 the 
Supreme Court has yet to realistically approve a remedial measure that 
adequately eliminates the systemic vestiges of slavery and racism that are 
pervasive in this society. 
Given the narrow parameters within which race-based affirmative 
action programs may withstand the strict scrutiny analysis, this constitu­
tional standard has become "strict in theory, but fatal in fact."34 Justice 
O'Connor in Adarand notes, however, that although the Court must give 
a "detailed examination, both as to ends and as to means,"35 the 
Supreme Court would uphold constitutionally permissible race-based 
classifications. In order to withstand constitutional scrutiny, the reasons 
underlying the implementation of race-based affirmative action programs 
must be compelling and clearly legitimate. 36 In addition, the remedial 
measures imposed by the race-based affirmative action program must be 
narrowly tailored to address the discriminatory conduct. 37 Although the 
current group of Supreme Court justices has yet to address the degree of 
historic discrimination that must be established before race-based 
affirmative action programs may be incorporated into the admissions 
procedures of law schools,38 the Supreme Court has upheld a race-based 
used to challenge a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to challenges brought 
under the Fifth Amendment. Id. 
32 Id. at 2114. 
33 Id. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 




38 The Supreme Court may have an opportunity to consider this issue in the 
event that the court grants the writ of certiorari expected to be filed by the 
University of Texas at Austin to appeal the Fifth Circuit decision in Hopwood 
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affinnative action program initiated to redress over four decades of 
"pervasive, systematic, and obstinate" discriminatory hiring practices.39 
Implicit in this analysis is the ultimate conclusion that the remedial 
benefits of constitutionally pennissible race-based affinnative action 
programs will be narrow in scope, limited in number, and have no 
appreciable impact on improving the social, economic and political 
condition of racial and ethnic minorities. 
The curious aspect underlying the principle of consistency is that it 
requires the court to apply the strict scrutiny analysis to race-based 
classifications affecting Blacks and whites in order to insure that the 
constitutional guarantee of equal protection is administered to everyone 
in an identical fashion. However, the principle does not account for the 
less restrictive intennediate scrutiny analysis afforded to gender-based 
classifications. 
2. Gender-based Affirmative Action Programs 
Several white women interviewed in the study were interested in the 
continuation of affirmative action programs as a means of correcting the 
gender inequality currently in existence at the subject law school. 
One thing that I think will happen is the Good Old Boy network that 
was alluded to will come back even stronger, because at least where I'm 
from and what I'm used to, ninety-nine percent of all the attorneys in 
[my hometown] were white guys, whose dads were attorneys, whose 
v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). On March 2 1 ,  1 996, in a televised 
intei:iew with Edie Magnus of CBS This Morning, Dr. Robert Ber��
l, 
President of the University stated that UT will appeal the Fifth Circuit's dec1s1on 
to the Supreme Court. 
39 Adarand, 1 1 5 S. Ct. at 2 1 1 7  (citing United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 
l49, 167 (1 ��7) (plurality opinion). In Paradise, the Supreme Court held that 
race-
.
basedhmng and promotion quotas imposed on the Alabama Department of 
Pubhc Safe� to force the hiring and promotion of Black troopers and support 
personnel dtd not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The Supreme Court noted that the lower courts in the cas
e 
conclusively determined that "[ d]iscrimination at the entry level necessarily p�ecluded Blac� from competing for promotions, and resulted in a department
al 
h�er�c�y dominated exclusively by nonrninorities." 480 U.S. at 168. The discnmmatory hiring practices identified in Paradise had been utilized by the State of Alabama for ov th' · · · t d by er trty-seven years before this action was irut1a e the NAACP. 
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grandfathers were attorneys, whose great-grandfathers were attorneys, 
so when little Johnny gets about fifteen, Johnny works as a clerk in the 
law office, little Johnny takes the perfect major to get the perfect 
resume, has the perfect experience, barn, they start looking at nothing 
but paper credentials. I think there's a guy here whose father is a 
lawyer in my hometown, you can tell he's been groomed from day one 
and I think that's  what ' s  going to happen. Because unfortunately you 
don't have a lot of women who can say well my mother was a lawyer, 
and my mother's mother was a lawyer. African-Americans see the same 
way, I can't think right off the bat of any Black lawyers in [my 
hometown], and that's a big town and that's really sad. You're not 
going to see the people like you going well, my Dad's an attorney and 
my aunt was an attorney and I'm following the tradition. Only people 
who have that tradition are white men. If you get away from anything 
other than paper credentials you won't see both minority and wom­
en 
. . . . 
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However, some of the white women interviewed in this study were 
noticeably indifferent to the impact that social and legal challenges to 
affirmative action programs would have on their lives.40 One significant 
reason for this indifference may be explained by the Supreme Court's less 
exacting constitutional standard of review for gender-based preferences. 
Unlike racial classifications, the Supreme Court applies an intermediate 
level of scrutiny when reviewing equal protection challenges to gender­
based classifications.41 This lesser standard of review leads to the 
curious result that gender-based preferences may withstand Equal 
Protection challenges, but race-based programs will generally fail. 
40 Another reason for the indifferent response by white women to the 
possible elimination of affirmative action programs may be the considerable 
academic accomplislunents of the white women applying to law school. See 
EPSTEIN, supra note 15 ,  at 5 6:  
However, the problem raised by preference for women is unlike the 
problem of other minority group preferences because women applicants 
have generally been better qualified than men. A 1 972 survey of eight 
elite and "semi-elite" law schools revealed that over 53 percent of the 
women, compared with only 38 percent of the men, graduated in the top 
l 0 percent of their undergraduate institutions. The average law school 
admission test (LSA T) score did not vary significantly by sex. 
41 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 1 97 ( 1976) (affirming that gender 
classifications are subject to intermediate level scrutiny). 
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To withstand constitutional challenge, gender-based classifications 
must "seive important government objectives and must be substantially 
related to achievement of those objectives.''42 This intermediate standard, 
although substantial, can be sustained where the gender-based classifica­
tion "intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that is 
disproportionately burdened."43 As noted by Justice O'Connor in 
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,44 a classification is imper­
missible if its underlying purpose is to foster archaic and stereotypical 
notions.45 In Hogan,46 the Court struck down a statute excluding men 
from a state-supported professional nursing school upon concluding that 
an admission restriction favoring women was unnecessary in the already 
female-dominated nursing profession. 47 The Court noted that a statute 
violates the Equal Protection Clause "if the statutory objective is to 
exclude or 'protect' members of one gender because they are presumed 
to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior . . .  .''48 
Courts have taken the view that laws should not overly burden 
women by trying to protect them. In Associated General Contractors, Inc. 
v. City and County of San Francisco, the Ninth Circuit noted that "(a] 
thin line divides governmental actions that help correct the effects of 
invidious discrimination from those that reinforce the hannful notion that 
the women need help because they can't make it on their own.''49 It is 
a difficult task, however, to locate that line. 
The weakness in the principle of consistency announced by the 
Adarand50 decision becomes apparent in cases like Associated General 
Contractors where the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit invalida�ed 
the race-based component of an ordinance that established an affinnat1ve 
action plan for women and minorities, but sustained the gender-based 
42 Id. See also Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 7 1 8, 724 
( 1982) (reiterating the application of the intermediate level scrutiny test to 
gender-based classifications). 
:
 Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 728. 
Id. at 718. 
4 5  Id. at 729. 
46 Id. at 733. 
47 Id. at 728-33. 
48 Id. at 725 . 
• 49 8 1 3  F.2d 922, 940 (9th Cir. 1 987) (holding that a provision of a city ordin�ce that gave preference to minority-owned businesses violated the Equal Protection Clause, but provisions that ga &: t tiemale-owned . . ve preJ.erence o businesses were facially valid under an equal t t. 1 · ) so pro ec ion ana ys1s . Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 1 1 5 s. Ct. 2097, 2 1 1 1  ( 1 995). 
1995-96] SILENT BENEFICIARJES 959 
component of the ordinance.5 1  As noted by Justices Stevens and 
Ginsberg in their dissenting opinion in Adarand: 
If this remains the law, then today's  lecture about ' consistency' will 
produce the anomalous result that the government can more easily enact 
affirmative action programs to remedy discrimination against women 
than it can enact affirmative action programs to remedy discrimination 
against African-Americans - even though the primary purpose of the 
Equal Protection Clause52 was to end discrimination against the former 
slaves. . . . When a court becomes preoccupied with abstract stan­
dards, it risks sacrificing common sense at the altar of formal consisten­
cy.s3 
51 Associated General Contractors, 8 1 3  F.2d at 94 1 .  
52 For an examination of racism and sexism in the historic development of 
constitutional equal protection rights for women and Blacks under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, see generally Sandra L. Rierson, Race and Gender Discrimination: 
A Historical Case for Equal Treatment Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL 'y 89 ( 1 994). It is important to note that affirmative 
action legislation was not originally applicable to women. As originally drafted, 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, religion, or national origin. After heated debate, the final version signed 
into law included a prohibition against gender discrimination as well. Thereafter 
on September 24, 1965, President Johnson issued Executive Order No. 1 1 ,246, 
3 C.F.R. 339 ( 1 964-65), which prohibited the federal government and its 
contractors from engaging in employment discrimination because of "race, creed, 
color, or national origin" and required them to take affirmative steps to insure 
the equitable treatment of all workers. Two years later, Johnson issued Executive 
Order No. 1 1 ,375, 3 C. F.R. 684 ( 1 966-70), which amended Executive Order No. 
1 1 ,246 by including sex as a protected classification. Executive Order No. 
1 1 ,375 provides, in pertinent part: "It is the policy of the United States 
Government to provide equal opportunity in federal employment and in 
employment by federal contractors on the basis of merit and without discrimina­
tion because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin." RACIAL PREFERENCE 
AND RACIAL JUSTICE app. F (Russell Nieli ed., 1 990). 
For a good discussion of this issue, see CLAYTON & CROSBY, supra note 6, 
at 13;  Alice Kemler-Harris, Feminism and Affirmative Action, in DEBATING 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 70-7 1 (Nicolaus Mills ed. , 1 994). 
53 Adarand, 1 1 5 S. Ct. at 2 1 22 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Ensley 
Branch NAACP v. City of Birmingham, 3 1  F.3d 1 548, 1 579 ( 1 994) ("While it 
may seem odd that it is now easier to uphold affirmative action programs for 
women than for racial minorities, Supreme Court precedent compels that 
result."). 
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The judiciary's quest for consistency has placed men and women on an 
equal constitutional footing. The Supreme Court' s  consistency approach 
does not, however, extend to the constitutional treatment of white women 
and Blacks. Until such time as the Supreme Court reconciles this 
paradoxical situation, this issue will continue to be a source of social, 
economic, and political conflict between white women and Blacks. 54 
D. Elimination of Affirmative Action Programs in Law Schools 
The most ardent disapproval of affirmative action programs was 
expressed by the two white women55 who refused to participate in the 
academic support programs. One student noted that she does not think 
"people who don't have the ability should take the place of someone who 
does have the ability." She indicated that in  the absence of affinnative 
action goals at the subject law school, the composition of the law school 
student body would be very different. Although she refused to identify 
those students who, in her opinion, lacked the requisite capabilities, she 
stated that "I can pick out a few who wouldn't be here." The other white 
student made an effort to reconcile her ambivalent feelings about this 
issue: 
I can tell you what the cases say. But I think that affirmative action is 
a bad answer to a worse problem. I think that the ramifications of 
affirmative action I mean, you know, one of the reasons we have it is 
because of misconceptions about a race or about a sex or whatever, 
these people are barred because of past historical or whatever but now 
we're just changing the stigma. We're just changing evils now. We 
think, maybe we're just keeping the same stigma. A woman couldn't do 
it if she was to do it on her own merit. A Black person couldn't do it 
if they did it on their own merit. I think a lot of white males and maybe 
even some, I don't know what everyone, maybe that's what the world 
54 F d. . . ·"'a or a 1scuss1on of racial tensions among study participants, see ml'' 
notes 55-56 and accompanying text. 55 It h b . g as een suggested that there are psychological reasons for the groWUl attacks ?n affinnative action programs. CLAYTON & CROSBY, supra note 6, at 
24 (noting that ". · · the vehemence with which some white women · · · a
nd 
p�op�e ?f �olor · · · argue against programs designed to help the victims of d1scnmmation may i art d 
· 
. . . th myth of . n P enve from a defensive addiction to e 
�entocracy: �Y success they have achieved, they may want or need to belie
ve, 
� d�e 10. th�ir own efforts and raw talent. . . . Either way, it is hard to es
cape 
t e 1mphcat1ons of self-interest."). 
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perceives it as that we have to give them equal opportunities inclination 
because they can't do it on their own. I don't  know that we're helping 
the situation any, but then again, what if we didn't  have affirmative 
action? What would motivate people to overcome their own stereotyping 
and their own prejudices? Why would they suddenly bring a woman 
into law school if they know such and such man who's been the head 
of this finn and he has a son who wants to go to law school and I can 
go and play golf with him and why would they accept a woman? They 
would be perfectly fine with only men. And then why would whites 
suddenly let in Blacks, for so long they have believed were not as 
qualified. So really it has to be and then, to even the playing ground 
because it hasn't been even for so long but then I think we are making 
some sad tradeoffs also. That's my perception. I don't know if that is 
right or wrong. I don't think it's out the door because many thinking 
people, hopefully, will realize that we have to keep something intact 
because we're only thirty years since the revolution really. Why would 
thirty years overcome hundreds of years of past discrimination . . .  But 
I don't know that it is the complete be and end all, perfect resolution 
that we really need. 
96 1 
The aforementioned white female students also argued that academic 
support programs do not belong in law school, and should fall under the 
anti-affirmative action ax: 
If you have been accepted to law school well really then isn't that all 
that was needed. Once you're here you may be the last one student in 
class but you need to be able to pass your classes and if you can't then 
why were you accepted. And then you think that maybe we need to be 
getting people through law school and this is horrible of me to say that 
I don't think the law is to be getting people through law school. The 
law is to be making lawyers and if they can do it in class then they'll 
do it and they'll do it in the world but if you're, but how else did you 
get into law school. You should have been qualified to get here before 
you got here to some degree. Now how affirmative action works in with 
that, that doesn't mean you're not qualified simply because you, you 
know, I may have been a poor [rural] student who didn't do the best 
grades at [a small, local college] or wherever and then we say, well 
we're going to let that person in anyway but we expect that they should 
keep up with everyone else in class. And maybe that requires working 
harder but that's your job isn't it. If you want to go to law school, we 
all had to work hard. Maybe I have something, maybe I wasn't in the 
retention program, maybe there was something in my background that 
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really impedes my learning ability, you know, something. Maybe I 've 
been out of school for whatever years. Maybe I didn't do well. I know 
students who didn't do well in undergrad who got on probation . . .  and 
who are not in the academic program and they didn't do as well as I 
did. How are they choosing these people, that's what I want to know. 
How did we get selected. . . but I bet you could ask any of them to 
identify themselves for a learning program they thought they were 
identifying themselves for someone who could be good in law school. 
You know, and so I wonder what is their role here. But if you are going 
to have them, if someone does disagree with me and says, yes, I think 
we need something for students who can't do well then it needs to be 
voluntary and it needs to be, everyone should be given the option . . . .  
Isn't that really the, that's the goal and you haven't stigmatized anyone. 
You haven't said to anyone, "We as an institution that has been here for 
years know that you might not do well." You have people coming to 
law school saying I'm challenged more than anyone else because it is 
so hard. This class must be harder for me than it is for anyone else in 
class. They had such a good answer in class, I could never have thought 
of that. I mean, why, and you feel immediately that you could not do 
well. If you need to make it voluntary across the board and then people 
will drop out if they don't need it. And if they need it, they stay in. 
Well wasn't that the goal. 
One of the white women, who has become very good friends with 
several of the minority students in the academic support program, 
expressed some ambivalence about pennitting affirmative action to have 
an impact on the admissions process: 
Well, I look at this from two sides because I don't know how big a role 
that plays here at the law school, but I know that not everybody comes 
from the same opportunities and it isn't fair to keep somebody out 
because they don't have the chance to prove themselves first just 
enough to get in. But I know from just talking about LSAT [Law 
School Aptitude Test] scores and GPA's that the girl that I was closest 
to in undergrad, she didn't make it in and she was white and I know 
that her scores were higher than some of my Black friends that I talked 
to and it hurts me that she didn't get in and we don't get to study 
together and I never see her anymore but I understand that it's 
necessary because not everybody has had the opportunities to prove 
themse
.
lves first. So as far as that goes I wish she could have gotten in. 
� feel 
�tke she got knocked out but I know that the people who did get 
10 are Just as worthy as she is. Maybe they didn't have the same chance 
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but I guess I'm just tom because I understand, I see both sides but it 
still hurts a little bit because I know she would have done really well 
too. So I can't say that I ' m, I guess I ' m straddling the fence but I can ' t  
help it because I see it from both sides. I know i t  is necessary but it 
hurts me that it does knock other people out too. 
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The concerns of the Black women participants regarding the possible 
elimination of race-based affirmative action programs were expressed by 
a third-year student who noted that: 
Well, there is the CLEO program fighting for its life. And as soon as 
I heard the decisions6 come down, the big one this summer I was like, 
well. I immediately thought about CLEO and we discussed it out at 
work because, you know, the retention programs and all they are 
basically geared toward women and people who are disadvantaged 
according to the Supreme Court these days that is discrimination and it 
will probably be out the door pretty soon. 
With the exception of Justice Powell's plurality opinion in Bakke,51 the 
constitutional legitimacy of using race-based preferences in higher edu­
cation recruitment and retention efforts has never been fully addressed by 
the Supreme Court. However, it is interesting to note that in two separate 
actions, white women have sought to eliminate race-based affirmative 
action programs from the law school admission process. 
In Henson v. University of Arka.nsas,58 a white, female applicant 
raised an equal protection challenge to the law school's minority 
preference admission system. In Henson, which is a pre-Bakke decision, 
the University of Arkansas School of Law established a special admission 
category for minority students who were not admitted under two other 
categories that focused on prediction indexes and state residency 
considerations. 59 The standard for admission of minority students under 
the special category was based on a subjective determination of whether 
s6 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 1 1 5 S. Ct. 2097, 2 1 1 2- 1 7  ( 1 995) 
(holding that all racial classifications are to be analyzed under a strict scrutiny 
standard, and that a racial classification will only pass constitutional muster if it 
is a specific measure advancing compelling government interests). 
57 438 U.S. 265 ( 1 978) (plurality opinion). 
58 5 19 F.2d 576 (8th Cir. 1 975). 
59 Id. at 577. 
964 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 84 
they had a "reasonable likelihood" of success in law school. 60 The 
plaintiff raised an equal protection challenge to the use of the special 
minority admission category. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district 
court's dismissal of the action after an evidentiary hearing on the merits 
of the case. 6 1 The court never addressed the equal protection argument 
because it detennined that the plaintiff was not injured by the law 
school's minority preference admission system because she could not 
establish ''that it was the application of those policies to her that kept her 
out of Law School, and that but for those policies she would have been 
adm• ed n62 Itt . . . .  
In the more famous case of Hopwood v. Texas,63 an unsuccessful 
white female law school applicant, together with several unsuccessful 
white male applicants, raised equal protection challenges to the University 
of Texas School of Law's affirmative action program. 64 In Hopwood, 
the School of Law established special admissions criteria for minority 
students in an effort to remedy past discrimination in Texas ' public 
higher education system and increase the number of minority students 
enrolled in law school.65 Specifically, the plaintiffs challenged several 
components of the law school's 1 992 admissions program. One compo­
nent of the program differentiated between the scores for presumptive 
admits and denials based on minority and nonminority status. 66 Another 
component of the program permitted a minority subcommittee of the 
Admissions Committee to review applications from minorities that fell 
within a discretionary zone. 67 Although the School of Law did not 
establish quotas, the school acknowledged admissions targets or aspira­
tions of ten percent Mexican-American students and five percent Black 
students, subject to the quality of the applicant pool. 68 The School of 
Law indicated that "[t]hese numbers reflect an effort to achieve an 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 576. 
62 Id. at 578. 
63 861 F. Supp. 5 5 1  (W.D. Tex. 1 994), rev 'd and remanded, 78 F.3d 932 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 1 1 6 S. Ct. 258 1 ( 1 996). This author is currently 
developing an article that will thoroughly examine the significance of the 
Hopwood decisions, and their impact on race-based admissions and retention 
criteria in legal education. 
64 Id. at 553. 
65 Id. at 556-62. 
66 Id. at 560. 
67 Id. at 561 -62. 
68 Id. at 563. 
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entering class with levels of minority enrollment generally consistent with 
the percentages of Black and Mexican American college graduates."69 
The plaintiffs also challenged the constitutionality of these admissions 
targets. 
Relying on the Supreme Court 's  decisions in City of Richmond v. 
JA. Croson Co. ,70 and Bakke,11 the trial court in Hopwood determined 
that the School of Law's affirmative action programs utilized race-based 
classifications which triggered the application of the strict judicial 
scrutiny test under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment. 72 The court noted: 
The most compelling justification for application of strict scrutiny in 
this context is to provide assurance that individual rights are afforded 
the full protection they merit under the Constitution. Only by applying 
strict scrutiny can a court honestly weigh the validity and necessity of 
efforts to remedy past wrongs against the rights of otherwise qualified 
nonminorities affected by the efforts. Although the use of racial 
classifications is disfavored. there are instances when such classifications 
serving proper purposes should be upheld. Only through diligent judicial 
examination can a court determine if a classification is consistent with 
constitutional guarantees and not related to "illegitimate notions of racial 
inferiority or simple racial politics."73 
The court's application of the strict scrutiny test is a two-pronged 
analysis. The state must establish that there is a "  'compelling governmen­
tal interest' "  served by the program, and that the program is " 'narrowly 
tailored to the achievement of that interest. ' "74 The School of Law 
introduced its Statement of Policy on Affirmative Action to provide the 
compelling interest required under the test.75 
69 Id. 
10 488 U.S. 469, 493 ( 1 989). 
7 1 438 U.S. 265, 29 1 ( 1 978) (plurality opinion). 
72 Hopwood, 8 6 1  F. Supp. at 568. 
73 Id. at 569 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493). 
74 Id. (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,  476 U.S. 267, 274 ( 1 986)). 
75 Id. at 569-70. The School of Law's Statement of Policy on Affirmative 
Action reads: 
To achieve the School of Law's mission of providing a first class legal 
education to future leaders of the bench and bar of the state by offering 
real opportunities for admission of the two largest minority groups in 
Texas, Mexican Americans and African Americans; To achieve the 
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The court concluded: "Although [the policy statements] are important 
and laudable goals,76 the law school's efforts, to be consistent with the 
Equal Protection Clause, must be limited to seeking the educational 
benefits that flow from having a diverse student body and to addressing 
the present effects of past discriminatory practices. "77 As a result, the 
court held that the law school's interest in "obtaining the educational 
benefits that flow from a racially and ethnically diverse student body,"78 
coupled with its remedial efforts to overcome past discrimination in the 
University of Texas system and the Texas educational system as a whole 
was a compelling enough governmental interest. 79 
Notwithstanding the compelling governmental interest underlying the 
law school's affirmative action program,80 the court concluded that the 
program violated the Equal Protection Clause because it was not narrowly 
diversity of background and experience in its student population 
essential to prepare students for the real world functioning of the law 
in our diverse nation; To assist in redressing the decades of educational 
discrimination to which African Americans and Mexican Americans 
have been subjected in the public school systems of the State of Texas; 
To achieve compliance with the 1983 consent decree entered with the 
Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Education imposing specific 
requirements for increased efforts to recruit African American and 
Mexican American students; To achieve compliance with the American 
Bar Association and the American Association of Law Schools 
standards of commitment to pluralist diversity in the law school's 
student population. 
Id. at 570. 
7 6  It is interesting to note that District Judge Sparks' decision in Hopw�od 
seems to be compelled by law, not personal conviction. He notes that "[n]otwtth· 
standing the 
.
pe�onal views of this judge, it appears the goal of increas�g 
the 
number of mmonty members in the legal profession and j udiciary of Texas is no
t 
a legally sufficient reason to justify racial preferences under fourteenth 
ame��ent analysis." Id. at 570 n.56. Id. at 570. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, � 14 
(1978) (plurality opi�on) �"Ethnic diversity, however, is only one element 
in : 
range of factors a umvers1ty properly may consider in attaining the goal 0� heterogeneous student body.")· Podbe ky Ki 956 F 2d 52 57 (4th Cir. 1 991) ("Th ' rs v. rwan, . ' e Supreme Court has declared that in some situations the State may e�ac� a .rac�-exclusionary remedy in an attempt to eliminate the effects of past discnmmation. "). 
1s R 79 opwood, 861 F. Supp. at 570. Id. at 570-73. 
80 Id. at 573. 
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tailored enough to achieve the law school 's  goals . 8 1  The court concluded 
that "[t]he constitutional infirmity of the 1 992 l aw school admissions 
procedure, therefore, is not that it gives preferential treatment on the basis 
of race but the test fails to afford each individual applicant a comparison 
with the entire pool of applicants, not just those of the applicant 's  own 
race."s2 
In a recent decision,83 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit rejected the District Court's  conclusion that the School of Law ' s  
admissions policies were justified by compelling governmental interests. 
The Fifth Circuit held that the goal of achieving diversity through race­
based affirmative action initiatives was constitutionally impermissible.84 
As a result of this holding, the court found that it was not necessary to 
address the second prong of the strict scrutiny test to determine whether 
the remedial measures in the law school 's  affirmative action plan were 
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.85 The appellate 
court noted that "any consideration of race or ethnicity by the law school 
for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body is not a compelling 
interest under the Fourteenth Amendment."86 In addition to concluding 
that race-based classifications serve to stigmatize their recipients, the Fifth 
Circuit asserted that 
the use of race in admissions for diversity in higher education contra­
dicts, rather than furthers, the aims of equal protection. Diversity 
fosters, rather than minimizes, the use of race. It treats minorities as a 
group, rather than as individuals. It may further remedial purposes but, 
just as likely, may promote improper racial stereotypes, thus fueling 
racial hostility.87 
In so doing, the court explicitly rejected the proposition advanced by 
Justice Powell in his plurality opinion in Bakke that the use of racial 
justifications to achieve a diverse student body "is a constitutionally 
pennissible goal for an institution of higher education."88 In rejecting 
81 Id. at 573-79. 
82 Id. at 578. 
83 Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 1 16 S. Ct. 258 1  
( 1 996). 
84 Id. at 944-48. 
85 Id. at 955. 
86 Id. at 944. 
87 Id. at 945. 
88 Id. at 943 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 3 1 1).  The Fifth Circuit notes that 
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every justification proffered by the School of Law, the Fifth Circuit held 
that 
the University of Texas School of Law may not use race as a factor in 
deciding which applicants to admit in order to achieve a diverse student 
body, to combat the perceived effects of a hostile environment at the 
law school, to alleviate the law school ' s  poor reputation in the minority 
community, or to eliminate any present effects of past discrimination by 
actors other than the law school. 89 
In light of Adarand, 90 the Hopwood decisions, and the Supreme 
Court's quest for a consistent application of the Equal Protection Clause, 
it is doubtful that race-based affirmative action programs will continue to 
influence the composition of law school student populations. The 
continued impact of gender-based affirmative action programs is, 
however, a mystery. If consistency is the ultimate goal of the Supreme 
Court, then it must reexamine its formalistic approach to the issues of 
race and gender. It is clearly inconsistent for the Court to apply a more 
relaxed standard of review to gender-based classifications than to race­
based classifications. This is especially troublesome when the need for 
remedial measures to counter the pervasive impact of racism has not been 
eliminated. In the absence of judicial leadership regarding this issue, the 
composition of graduate and professional schools will not be representa­
tive of the racial and ethnic population of this country. 
E. Affirmative Action as a Tool of Diversity 
In addition to being questioned about their opinions on affirmative 
action, the students were asked to discuss their concerns about the 
continued existence of academic support programs if affirmative action 
initiatives are eliminated.91 It was not unexpected that the students 
"[n]o case since Bakke has accepted diversity as a compelling state interest under 
strict scrutiny analysis." Id. at 944. 
89 Id. at 962. 
90 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 1 1 5 S. Ct. 2097, 2 1 12-13 (1 995). See 
supra notes 1 7-39 and accompanying text. 
91 In addition to judicial setbacks, affirmative action programs are also being 
reevaluated in the political and legislative arenas. Californians are currently 
debating the merits of the California Civil Rights Initiative ("CCRI") which is 
a legislative initiative designed to "forbid the use of ethnicity or gender 'as a 
criterion for either discriminating against, or granting preferential treatment to, 
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divided along racial l ines when discussing this issue. Several students 
believe that the elimination of affirmative action will give educational 
institutions free license to eliminate all programs that are designed to 
increase diversity in the legal profession: 
[I]t makes me think about survival of the fittest. If you're weak then 
you're gone and I don't know. I think coming into an environment like 
this I was real nervous and real intimidated and the program that I ' m  
in makes me feel like I belong a little bit more and am a little more 
comfortable and I think, you know, if you got the power you don 't need 
things like that. And I'm afraid that is how it will be. That will just be 
something that's just not important any more . 
. . . I think it gives people a way out and I think if it's not recognized 
on a federal level, then everybody may not take it as seriously, you 
know, and give it as much credibility as it needs to have, and diversify­
ing the legal profession or the medical profession or higher education, 
in general, I think that that's going to be an outlet for people who don't  
think that it's important. I think a lot of people that can't see beyond 
themselves to helping somebody else, and I guess you have to go within 
yourself to find out if that's important for you, but I think that it's 
going to be a way to say, well, Congress says we are going to have to 
do it, so we are not going to do it, and it' s just puke on you, and we 'll  
go somewhere else. I think they don't look to the importance of what 
the programs are really doing. Like what we are getting out of these 
programs doesn' t  cross racial lines and doesn't cross gender lines except 
it's going to help you succeed and be a good lawyer, doctor or 
whatever. I think they are missing the point of the programs and 
worrying about who is in the programs. So I think that's going to hurt 
us and as a result there is going to be less of us, and less of me and less 
of you, I don't think it's going to have a good effect. 
It was interesting to note that some of the white women, who were 
reluctant to acknowledge the impact of affirmative action programs in 
any individual or group. '  " Joe Klein, The End of Af irmative Action, NEWSWEEK, 
Feb. 13, 1995, at 36-37 (discussing CCR! and its impact on California and the 
national political arena). See also Peter Annin, Battleground Chicago Report 
From the Front: How Racial Preferences Really Work - Or Don 't, NEWSWEEK, 
Apr. 3, 1995, at 26-33 ;  Howard Fineman, Rage & Race, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 3, 
1 995, at 23-25. 
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their lives, agreed that the programs should continue in order to effectuate 
racial diversity.92 
Now that they are really chipping away at affirmative action, the thing 
that concerns me is that, things are not equal out there and I think a lot 
of us would agree. But I hear people say all the time, well women are 
treated equally as a woman, it's nice that you have been treated equally, 
but look around you, the m inorities are not treated equally and my 
concern was with the decline of affirmative action that other people, 
maybe a lot of white males and a lot of other people too will think that 
everything is equal now and we really don't need it at all, and it can 
really help everyone. I 'm just afraid that it's going to hurt a lot a 
people. 
F. Tension Between Black and White Women Regarding Their Views 
on Affirmative Action 
A recurring theme underlying the comments of the white female 
participants93 in this study is apathy toward the preservation of affirma­
tive action initiatives incorporated either formally or informally into law 
school ad.missions and academic support programs. The reticence of the 
white women interviewed to support the continued implementation of 
92 In response to a question regarding the complexion of the student body 
at UT after the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hopwood, Dr. Robert Berdahl, 
President, University of Texas at Austin, noted that: 
Well, I think if this ruling stands, universities like the University of 
Texas that have selective admissions policies will have much smaller 
representation from minority students. I think one thing that's important 
for us to remember in all of this is that the students who were admitted 
- the minority students who were admitted are highly qualified 
students. These are not students who . . . don't belong in this university. 
We have very high standards for admission for all of our students, and 
we're talking about very marginal differences between those of - of 
minority applicants and those of majority applicants so that we simply 
have a pro - had a process whereby in order to achieve diversity in the 
student popul�tion, in order to provide opportunities to minori1?' 
students, we did take - in those small number of cases where their 
�cores were slightly lower than the majority students, we did take race 
mto account to achieve that end. 
Comments from televised interview of Dr. Berdahl, Cheryl Hopwood, and her atto
n;;y, Ted Olson by Edie Magnus, CBS This Morning, March 2 1 ,  1996· See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. 
1995-96] SILENT BENEFICIARIES 97 1 
affinnative action programs parallels the struggle between race and 
�der that manifested itsel f during the Reconstruction Era suffrage 
movement. 
The participants in this study raised some of the same concerns 
expressed by the women in the Declaration of Sentiments issued by the 
participants of the Seneca Falls Conference in 1 848, which is discussed 
in the introduction to this symposium edition. 94 These are the same 
concerns and issues that women, regardless of race, continue to grapple 
with almost 1 50 years later. As expressed by the participants in this 
study, tension exists between women over the allocation of social, 
economic, and political resources generated by affirmative action 
gains.95 In 1848, the resource at issue was suffrage, which brought its 
9-4 Carolyn S. Bratt, Introduction, 84 KY. L.J. 7 1 5  ( 1 995-96). For example, 
in ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE & CLASS ( 1 9 8 1 ), Davis notes the 
contradictions inherent in the 1 848 Seneca Falls Convention: 
The inestimable importance of the Seneca Falls Declaration was its role 
as the articulated consciousness of women 's rights at midcentury. It was 
the theoretical culmination of years of unsure, often silent, challenges 
aimed at a political, social, domestic and religious condition which was 
contradictory, frustrating and downright oppressive for women of the 
bourgeoisie and the rising middle classes. However, as a rigorous 
consummation of the consciousness of white middle-class women 's  
dilemma, the Declaration all but ignored the predicament of white 
working-class women, as it ignored the condition of [b ]lack women in 
the South and North alike. In other words,  the Seneca Falls Declaration 
proposed an analysis of the female condition which disregarded the 
circumstances of women outside the social class of the document's 
framers. 
Id. at 53-54. 
95 See generally Elizabeth Debold et al., From Betrayal to Power, 1 DUKE 
J. GENDER L. & PoL'Y 53 ( 1 994) (discussing the tension between parties 
desiring suffrage based on race and on gender). 
Within the last hundred-plus years, white women have repeatedly 
opted to exercise their race privilege in order to g ain an advantage in 
the competitive public world. The fledgling coalition of white and 
African-American women fighting for suffrage was violently tom apart 
when it became clear that Congress was seriously considering granting 
suffrage to men o f  color and not to women at all. White women argued 
that they, because of their race, should be granted the right to vote 
before men or women of color. This betrayal, white women's shame, 
leaves a bitter taste in the mouths of African-American women even 
today. Most women of color have justifiably internalized a deep 
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holder the promise of both political and economic freedom. In 1996, one 
of the resources that causes contention between white women and minori­
ties is affirmative action. The privileges associated with affirmative action 
programs similarly provide its beneficiaries with the promise of political 
and economic freedom. 
Many would argue that affirmative action programs helped white 
women obtain those promised levels of political and economic freedom. 
However, Blacks and other minority groups have not been as fortunate. 
As a result, the struggle to preserve this remedial initiative continues in 
earnest. However, the fight has lost a necessary ally because white 
women, at least to the extent evidenced by the students in this study, are 
reluctant to either acknowledge the benefits of affirmative action 
programs or advocate for their continuation. Most of the Black women 
in this study readily assume that their presence in law school was the 
explicit or implicit result of some type of affirmative action initiative. 
Contrary to popular belief, however, this acknowledgement empowers the 
women interviewed: 
Coming in, just the people from the outside, some people say the only 
reason . . . you got in [the subject law school] is because of affinnative 
action and sometimes that gives you a complex, then you say in my 
situation, I'll just work harder and prove that that's not the only reason 
why I'm here. 
· 
· 
· I think I did have some kind of sick little thing I wanted to prove 
that I was just as smart as everyone else. I think I did have that. So 
that's why I really prepared for class, I wanted to answer all the 
questions correctly and I think I impressed a few [faculty members]. 
· · · I'm trying to prove that I deserve to be here just as much as the 
guy that is sitting next to me. And that is probably why I feel like I 
have to answer these questions [asked by professors in class] if l know 
them. 
suspicio� and mistrust of white people. Women of color were not heard 
or consider
� an integral part of the last phase of the women's 
I?ovement. Tired of educating white women about their racist assump­tions, 
. 
many women of color have given up on the possibility of speaking across race. White women can begin to educate themselves about the privilege they assume. 
Id. at 6 1 .  
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That's one of the reasons that I'm here . . . .  Because I just don' t  think 
that we'll get that chance to prove ourselves if affinnative action is 
eliminated that we have now. And I just worry about future generations. 
I worry about my sister coming after me. How is it going to be for her. 
It's something I think about pretty much daily. 
973 
The white female students were not as eager to acknowledge the role 
affirmative action may have played in their admission to law scho ol : 
It bothers me that it is necessary. I would like to think that we're all 
here because of what 's in here [head] not because we're female or 
we're Black, you know. 
I don't like to think so but I'm a woman and I ' m  in law school .  This 
is a [public] school and generally been, you know, a male dominated 
field . . .  I'm a woman and it could just as easily got me into school 
and that's not a good thought. And I have been told that by someone 
who didn't get into law school and his parents were very angry. They're 
from back home and he didn't get into law school and they were angry 
that I had gotten into law school . . . .  And they thought that it was 
because I was a woman. And I 've actually been told that. Now whether 
that is true or not . . .  I 'm as qualified as well as any other person here 
. . . . [s]o maybe if there was no affinnative action I still would have 
made the cut and you know, I don't know. I don't know how that 
works really. I don't know if they go through and choose so many 
women and so many men then that clearly would be not allowed. But 
if they go for the sake of diversity, wanted to bring in these women and 
oh, she's a poor woman, that's even better. And she's from (a small, 
rural area], . . .  she's going to fit lots of our areas. 
Well, I like to think that I got into law school based on my brain not 
on the fact that I was an old woman and I guess maybe when I walked 
in that room for that academic support program thing it made me feel 
as if I was chosen, as i f  maybe that I might have gotten into law school 
not based on my ability. That would have made me very angry. I don't 
want to get anything because I 'm a woman or because I'm filling a slot 
with a certain number of females over the age of forty. I don't know 
how I really feel about affirmative action. I can see the benefit of it but 
I do think people's ability ought to be the primary measuring point not 
whether they are Black, white, yellow or orange or female or male. 
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If the past is prologue for the future, history teaches us that the struggle 
to preserve affirmative action programs will be as divisive to the 
intersection of race and gender96 as it was in the 1 800s when the fight 
for suffrage caused a fissure between Black and white women in the 
suffrage movement. 
During the Reconstruction Era, Blacks and white women, most of 
whom were former abolitionists, shared a common goal - universal suf­
frage. 97 Notwithstanding the participation of Black women in the suf­
frage movement, they were noticeably absent from the 300 Seneca Falls 
conventioneers.98 Yet it was a Black man, Frederick Douglass, who 
96 Many commentators have contributed to the contemporary dialogue 
regarding the role of Black women in the feminist movement. See BELL HOOKS, 
KILLING RAGE ( 1 995) (discussing the role of Blacks and people of color in the 
feminist movement): 
It is usually materially privileged white women who identify as 
feminists, and who have gained greater social equality and power with 
white men in the existing social structure, who resist most vehemently 
the revolutionary feminist insistence that an anti-racist agenda must be 
at the core of our movement if there is ever to be solidarity between 
women and effective coalitions that cross racial boundaries and unite us 
in common struggle. These are the women who are detennined to leave 
the issue of race behind. 
Id. at 101 ;  Michele Wallace, A Black Feminist 's Search/or Sisterhood, in ALL 
THE WOMEN ARE WHITE, ALL THE BLACKS ARE MEN, BUT SOME OF Us ARE 
BRA VE 5-12 (Gloria T. Hull et al. eds., 1 982); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demargina­
lizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of AntiDiscri­
mination Doctrine, Feminist Theory andAntiracistPolitics, 1 989 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 1 39, 152-60; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal 
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 58 1 ( 1 990); see Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. 
Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Implication of Making 
Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other-ISMS}, 1 99 1  DUKE L.J. 397. 
97 For extensive analyses of suffrage, see generally DA VIS, supra note 94; 
ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE ( 1975); PAULA GIDDINGS, WHERE 
AND WHEN I ENTER ( 1 984); BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN ( 198 1 ); ELIZABETH 
C. STANTON ET AL., HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE (1 887). 
98 See DAVIS, supra note 94, at 57 (discussing the absence of Black women 
among the audience in attendance at the convention: "While at least one [b ]lack 
man was present . . .  there was not a single [b]lack woman in attendance. Nor 
did the convention's documents make even a passing reference to [b ]lack women. 
In light of the organizers' abolitionist involvement, it would seem puzzling that 
slave women were entirely disregarded."); F'LEXNER, supra note 97, at 75 (noting 
that the Seneca Falls conventioneers included an audience of 300, and that even 
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seconded the resolution introduced by Elizabeth Cady Stanton advocating 
voting rights for women.99 Although Douglass supported enfranchise­
ment of women, he never wavered in his belief that enfranchisement of 
Black men was of paramount importance. Douglass' urgent advocation 
for enfranchisement of Black men was due in large part to the physical 
jeopardy faced by Blacks during this period, as well as the need to 
eliminate the vestiges of slavery by permitting Blacks to develop 
economic and pol itical power. 1 00  
In 1 869, at a meeting of the American Equal Rights Association 
("AERA"), Douglass spoke about the need for Black men to obtain the 
vote: 
When women, because they are women, are hunted down through the 
cities of New York and New Orleans, when they are dragged from their 
though no men were invited, 40 men participated in the Convention). 
99 See ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE 40-4 1 ( 1 978) 
("Although the convention passed all other motions unanimously, it was seriously 
divided over the suffrage. Frederick Douglass, who, himself disfranchised, 
appreciated the importance of membership in the political community, was 
Stanton's staunchest supporter at Seneca Falls. The woman suffrage resolution 
barely passed."); see also STANTON ET AL., supra note 97, at 73 ("Mrs. Stanton 
and Frederick Douglass seeing that the power to choose rulers and make laws, 
was the right by which all others could be secured, persistently advocated the 
resolution, and at last carried it by a small majority."). 
100 Frederick Douglass prioritized Black male suffrage over suffrage for 
women because of the political, economic, and physical oppression experienced 
by Black men during the Reconstruction Era: 
Douglass argued to consolidate and secure the new "free" status of 
Southern Blacks: "Slavery is not abolished until the black man has the 
ballot." This was the basis for his insistence that the strategic priority, 
at the particular historical moment, over the effort to achieve the vote 
for women. Frederick Douglass viewed the franchise as an indispensable 
weapon which could complete the unfinished process of liquidating 
slavery. When he argued that woman suffrage was momentarily less 
urgent than the extension of the ballot to [b ]lack men, he was definitely 
not defending [b]lack male superiority. Although Douglass was by no 
means entirely free of the influence of male-supremacist ideology and 
while the polemical formulations of his arguments often leave some­
thing to be desired, the essence of his theory that [b )lack suffrage was 
a strategic priority was not in the least anti-women. 
DAVIS, supra note 94, at 77-78 (quoting Frederick Douglass, Speech at Seneca 
Falls Convention (July 1 9, 1 848)). 
976 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 84 
houses and hung upon lamp posts; when their children are tom from 
their anns, and their brains dashed upon the pavement; when they are 
objects of insult and outrage at every tum; when they are in danger of 
having their homes burnt down over their heads; when their children are 
not allowed to enter schools; then they will have an urgency to obtain 
the ballot equal to our own. 1 0 1  
The strategic importance Douglass placed on suffrage for Black men was 
not universally supported by Black women. Distinguished abolitionist, 
Sojourner Truth, 102 openly voiced her concerns that once empowered, 
Black men would exercise the same tyranny over Black women that white 
men had exercised for years. 103 Truth's views were countered by Black 
poet and educator, Frances Ellen Harper, 104 who believed that white 
racism, from men and women, was fundamentally more destructive to the 
goals of Black women than sexism from Black men. 105 Harper said that 
"[t]he white women all go for sex, letting race occupy a minor posi­
tion."106 However, she believed that "[b]eing black means that every 
101 GIDDINGS, supra note 97, at 67. When asked about the applicability of his 
statement to the rights of Black women, " 'Yes, yes, yes,' replied Douglass. 'It 
is true for the [b ]lack woman but not because she is a woman but because she 
is [b]lack! ' "  Id. 
102 BLACK WOMEN IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN LIFE 234-42 (Bert 
J. Loewenberg & Ruth Bogin eds., 1 976). 103 G IDDINGS, supra note 97, at 65. 
104 Frances Ellen Harper was a noted author, educator, and participant in the 
Underground Railroad. She wrote several poems about her experiences including 
The Slave Mother and Ethiopia. Giddings notes that from Harper's point of view: 
[T]he greatest obstacle to the progress of black women was not [b ]lack 
men but [w]hite racism, including the racism of her [w]hite "sisters." At 
a 1 869 convention, Harper expressed her support for the Fifteenth 
Amendment. By that year she had reason to believe that if the bill was 
defeated, [b ]lack women would be less, not more, secure. 
Id. at 66. 
Id. 
105 Id. Giddings wrote: 
�s an o
.�
cer of the AERA, Harper may have suspected that the 
[w]htte femirusts' sudden (and expedient) concern for [b]lack women 
w� less th� genuine. . . . Black women like Harper may have had 
their co�plamts against [b ]lack men, but they must have looked down on [ w ]hite women using them as fodder to further their own selfish ends. 
106 Id. at 68. 
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white, including every working-class white woman, can discriminate 
against you."1 01 Harper' s views proved to be prophetic. With the 
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, 108 white women became increas­
ingly concerned that Black men would be elevated in status109 and 
power over them. 1 1 0 As the fissure between Blacks and white women 
101 Id. 108 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
109 Elizabeth Cady Stanton and others who believed that because, in their 
eyes, emancipation had rendered [b]lack people "equal" to white 
women, the vote would render [b ]lack men superior, were absolutely 
opposed to [b]lack male suffrage. Yet there were those who understood 
that the abolition of slavery had not abolished the economic oppression 
of [b]lack people, who therefore had a special and urgent need for 
political power. 
DAVIS, supra note 94, at 72-73; see also DuBOIS, supra note 99: 
The abolitionists advocates of black suffrage made their case in a 
variety of ways, some of which coincided with arguments for woman 
suffrage, others of which emphasized the difference between the two 
demands. On the one hand, they argued that black men should be 
enfranchised because the suffrage was a right of all citizens and a 
source of self-respect and social power. Douglass described the 
psychological impact of disfranchisement on black men with great 
eloquence and in terms that could have been taken to apply equally to 
women. By disfranchising black people, he explained, "you declare 
before the world that we are unfit to exercise the elective franchise, and 
by this means lead us to undervalue ourselves, and to feel that we have 
no possibilities like other men." More frequently, however, supporters 
of black suffrage insisted on the special historical significance and 
unique strategic position of the ex-slaves. Southern blacks were a pro­
northem force in the heart of the Confederacy and this linked their 
enfranchisement to the preservation of the Union's victory and the 
protection of the Republican party's power. Black suffrage, its 
supporters argued, was the only secure basis for Reconstruction. 
Feminists could make no such claims of partisan benefit or political 
expediency for woman suffrage. · 
Id. at 56-57. 1 10 See DuBOIS, supra note 99, at 174-75.  DuBois discusses the tension 
between racism and sexism that manifested itself during the suffrage movement: 
The position Stanton and Anthony took against the Fifteenth 
Amendment reveals much about their political development after the 
Civil War and especially after their 1 867 break with abolitionists. Their 
objections to the amendment were simultaneously feminist and racist. 
On the one hand, their commitment to an independent women's 
. 
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over suffrage grew, 1 1 1  Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony 
became more adamant in their quest for women's suffrage. In their 
feminist newspaper, The Revolution, they wrote: 
While the dominant party have with one hand lifted up TWO MILLION 
BLACK MEN and crowned them with the honor and dignity of 
citizenship," wrote Anthony, "with the other they have dethroned 
FIFTEEN MILLION WHITE WOMEN - their own mothers and 
movement was intensifying the feminism that underlay their demand for 
woman suffrage. Although they acknowledged the similarities between 
the inferior position women held with respect to men and the status of 
other oppressed groups, they believed that women's grievances were 
part of a distinct system of sexual inequality, which had its own roots 
and required its own solutions. This led them to repudiate the Fifteenth 
Amendment, not only because women were omitted from its provisions, 
but because they believed that its ratification would intensify sexual 
inequality. They argued that the doctrine of universal manhood suffrage 
it embodied gave constitutional authority to men's claims that they were 
women's social and political superiors. On the other hand, this feminism 
was increasingly racist and elitist. The women among whom it was 
growing were white and middle-class and believed themselves the social 
and cultural superiors of the freedmen. The anti-Republican suffragists 
chose to encourage these women to feel that the Fifteenth Amendment 
meant a loss of status for them, and to try to transform their outraged 
elitism into an increased demand for their enfranchisement. New 
England suffragists also had racist arguments for women suffrage in 
their rhetorical arsenal, but the political decision to maintain abolition­
ists allies and to court Republican support kept them from using these 
weapons. By contrast, the Revolution 's militant anti-Republicanism 
permitted and even encouraged Stanton and Anthony to approach 
woman suffrage by way of attacks on the freedmen. 
Id. at 174-75. 
1 1 1  Although Stanton and Anthony were allied with Douglass in their 
campaigns to end slavery and obtain universal suffrage, Douglass' views on the 
issue of Black male suffrage were substantially different: 
The former slave population was still locked in a struggle to defend 
their lives - and in Douglass' eyes, only the ballot could ensure their 
victory. By contrast, the white middle-class women, whose interests 
were represented by Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, 
could not claim that their lives were in physical jeopardy. They were 
not, like [b]lack men and women in the South, engaged in an actual war 
for liberation. 
DAVIS, supra note 94, at 79. 
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sisters, their own wives and daughters - and cast them under the heel 
of the lowest orders of manhood. 1 1 2  
979 
One year before the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment1 13 giv­
ing Black men voting rights, the universal suffrage organization, 
AERA, founded by Douglass, Stanton, and Anthony, split over this 
issue. 1 14 Thereafter, the political movement for suffrage remained 
segregated. During the period following the passage of the Fifteenth 
Amendment, until women received voting rights in 1920 pursuant to 
the Nineteenth Amendment, 1 1 5  racial tensions continued to divide 
women suffragists. 1 1 6 
The racial mistrust and divisiveness that manifested itself during that 
period continues to cause dissension between Black and white wom­
en. 1 1 7 The students participating in this study discussed the tension that 
1 12 GIDDINGS, supra note 97, at 66. See also DuBOIS, supra note 99, at 162-
96, for a discussion of the role played by the Revolution in the feminist's 
repudiation of the Fifteenth Amendment. 1 1 3 The Fifteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "The right of 
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 .  1 14 G IDDINGS, supra note 97, at 67. 1 15 The Nineteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "The right of 
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied on account of sex." U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIX, § 1 .  1 1 6  At this time, black women suffragists struggled for their enfranchise­
ment in black women's organizations, or in segregated chapters of white 
women's organizations; they marched for their enfranchisement in 
segregated suffrage parades. However, many powerful forces in the 
country were convinced that extending the franchise to black women 
posed considerable risks. White women in the women's movement were 
concerned that requesting extension of the franchise to black women 
would damage their chances of gaining the vote for themselves. 
Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place, 
Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV . C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9, 3 1-32 (1989). 1 1 7  In Pamela J. Smith, We Are Not Sisters: African-American Women and 
the Freedom to Associate and Disassociate, 66 TULANE L. REV. 1467 ( 1 992), the 
author discusses the alienation Black women experience when discussing the 
issue of racism and sexism with white women, thus encouraging Black women 
to disassociate from white women: 
Racism may be the strongest reason for African-Americ
.
an �omen. to disassociate from white women. Whether the racism practiced is bemgn 
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continues to exist between white and Black women regarding issues of 
race and gender. The following exchange occurred in response to 
concerns raised by a Black student that her fellow white students seem to 
purposefully ignore racial incidents that occur at the subject law school: 
White Woman: I think you have a complaint when you said that a lot 
of the white people didn't notice. I think this isn't an excuse, I think 
they need to be made aware that, I think that white people who have 
always been around white people don't know. They just don't clue in, 
it doesn't hit them that that would be offensive. Because if you don't 
have Black friends or you haven't been around Black people, sometimes 
I guess you can't empathizes but that's no excuse. They need to be 
aware and say, "Hey, this is an offensive thing." 
White Woman: I understand what you're saying. I'm thinking too, 
though. I understand they haven't been around Black people but I think 
part of it too is subconsciously that's how they see Black people so to 
them it's like, okay. What's abnormal about this? We see it on the news 
every day. It's just normal to them. 
Black Woman: You two are white women and in a way, I guess I'm 
sometimes I'm more frustrated because I figure you 're a woman so 
somewhat of what I ' m  going through you should relate to simply 
because you're going to get it. 1 18 You're not getting it because of race 
or subconscious, it exists. African-American women cannot force or 
attempt to sway white women who may harbor racist feelings and 
attitudes. White women must first recognize any racial animosity that 
may be within themselves, and then try to confront these feelings. Until 
they do, African-American women must disassociate to concentrate on 
their unique problems and concerns. 
Id. at 1480. 
1 1
•
8 bell hooks writes that, without invalidating feminism, tension continues 
to exist between Black and white women. She notes: 
To black women the issue is not whether white women are more or less 
racist than white men, but that they are racist. If women committed to 
femi�ist revolution, be they black or white, are to achieve any under­
standing of the "charged connections" between white women and black 
wo�en, we must first be willing to examine woman' s relationship to 
�ociety, to race, and to American culture as it is and not as we would 
ideally have it be. 
HOOKS, supra note 97, at 124. 
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but because of gender. And sometimes I ' m  like, as a woman, not you 
particularly. but why do you have such trouble perceiving my frustra­
tions when you' re getting some yourself? Do you see what I 'm saying? 
Because I'm getting it as a woman and as a Black person so I guess I ' m  
frustrated i n  that sense too. As a white woman you should know 
somewhat of what I'm going through . . .  I don ' t  believe [white women 
understand]. I mean. I real ly don't  believe they do. 
CONCLUSION 
98 1 
It is clear that the women who participated in this study have 
experienced the stigmatizing effects of racism and sexism throughout 
their law school experience. The findings generated by this study suggest 
that the stigmatization of these women is not a by-product of the 
academic support or affirmative programs, but a systemic component of 
legal education that was merely exacerbated by another bade of inferiority 
- participation in the academic support program. Contrary to expecta­
tions, however, the women did not sit idly by and wait for the courts or 
the law school administration or even contemporary society to eliminate 
the negative perceptions that are so prevalent in their law school 
experience. A significant number of the study's participants achieved a 
high level of academic success that enabled them to carve out their own 
niche within the law school environment. By attaining the same academic 
honors and merit based career opportunities coveted by their male 
counterparts, the women made the stigma irrelevant in some cases, or if 
not irrelevant, at least worth the price of success. After the initial 
interviews were completed, a clear indication that the stigma associated 
with the academic support program at the subject law school was 
diminished is apparent from the requests by middle class white male 
students to participate in the program. The findings of this investigation 
clearly suggest that fear of stigmatizing should not outweigh the benefits 
associated with implementation of academic support programs in law 
school. 
Although it is clear that legal education must respond to the diverse 
needs of contemporary society by establishing programs that encourage 
the admittance and retention of women and minorities in law school, a 
question regarding the constitutional validity of race and gender b�ed 
affirmative action measures remains unresolved. Ultimately, the constitu­
tional validity of affirmative action programs will be decided b?' t�e 
Supreme Court. Until then, institutions will continue to mamt�m 
programs that attempt to allocate resources among divers� and competi�g 
groups, notwithstanding the atmosphere of uncertamty and stnfe 
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surrounding affirmative action. The fact that the study's  participants were 
divided along racial lines when discussing this issue presents a troubling 
indicator that this issue will continue to sustain a divisive barrier between 
women. 
